Jihadi Twitter Activism – Introduction

Posted April 27, 2013 by Nico Prucha
Categories: jihadica, online jihad

The posting with all links is available on the jihadica blog

http://www.jihadica.com/jihadi-twitter-activism-introduction/

Ali Fisher and I have recently exchanged thoughts and data regarding the increasing Jihadi use of Twitter. By taking an interdisciplinary approach of social-media analysis and cluster network assessment, we decided to start a series on Jihadica on the parts of the overall jihadi, primarily Arabic language propaganda resonating among the audiences online. We plan on delivering updates on the subject as we move along and kick-off the series with an overall introduction to the theme.

In future posts in the series, we will highlight and decipher some of the core content most often shared on Twitter, allowing conclusions to be drawn about the parts of jihadist propaganda which resonate with a wider audience (and hence shared over and over again).

Introducing the theme

The recent essay by Abu Sa‘d al-‘Amili on the state of global online jihad (discussed here) lamented a general decline in participation in jihadi online forums. Furthermore, al-‘Amili issued a “Call (nida’) to the Soldiers of the Jihadi Media” demanding that they “return to their frontiers (thughur)” elevating their status. Al-‘Amili himself is one of the high-profile clerics, a “prolific “Internet Shaykh” (Lia) on the forums, but is also quite active on twitter (@al3aamili).

Two interrelated causes identified by Abu Sa‘d al-‘Amili were the periods when forums were offline and the migration of users to social networking sites such as Twitter and Facebook. This is exacerbated by the movement of “major [jihadi] writers and analysts” (kibar al-kuttab wa-l-muhallilin) from the forums to social media platforms. This has perhaps increased the momentum of members of tier-one jihad forums to expand onto twitter while twitter as a massive communication relay has become the basis for a new generation of sympathizers, posing another intersection. Twitter is a further medium of choice to (re-) disseminate propaganda material in general and is a platform where activists, sympathizers, and actual fighters upload audiovisual and other types into the jihadi hub.

Jihadists have aggressively expanded the use of twitter, in addition to Facebook and YouTube, especially since the outbreak of violence in Syria. During 2011 members of Jihadist forums issued media-strategies and advisory to fellow members prior, as for example is stated in this posting here of the al-Ansar forum. The posting, initiated by the member Istishhadiyya is basically a very elemental guide, comprehensive and for beginners, highlighting the effective and fast communication capability. The same posting was copy-and-pasted by Shumukh member Basha’ir shortly afterwards. A handbook, compiled by Twitter user @osamh ended up on the jihadi forums to further underline the importance of Twitter as well as its difference to Facebook, where jihadists already have a strong presence.

It took a while for jihadi activism to fully unravel on Twitter, and they have maintained a cohesive as well as detailed presence on this social media platform since the Syrian conflict turned violent in 2012.

Twitter, and as such social media in general, is in the meantime an integral part of jihadists’ media endeavors on the Internet, with the majority of jihadi forums having their official account advertised for on the main pages of the forums.

The role of the media activists, or in jihadist speak the “media mujahid” has since the death of Osama bin Laden in May of 2011 been promoted, highlighted and approved. AQ related documents have made this role model prominent. The role model of the “media martyr” any “media mujahid” can be become, is backed by the call to take the fight on a greater level on al channels online issued by al-Fajr in their response of the killing of bin Laden:

“The Internet is a battlefield for jihad, a place for missionary work, a field of confronting the enemies of God. It is upon any individual to consider himself as a media-mujahid, dedicating himself, his wealth and his time for God.” (Analysis here, Arabic original here)

At first, the strategies to promote Twitter among members of jihadi forums failed to develop substantial traction, but this changed drastically during 2012. When jihadists in and outside of Syria started to use and incorporate twitter as a medium to disseminate and re-post al-Qa’ida and other propaganda material.

Twitter activism and jihadi supporters

At first Syrian non-violent activists used, and continue to use, twitter as a medium to document human rights abuse and war crimes of the Assad regime, but jihadists quickly adapted that content and the platform for their propaganda.

Social-media smart and professional jihadists adopted this treasure grove for their propaganda. By rebranding and reframing the content created by civil society activists, jihadi propaganda used these grievances to support a key jihadist self-perception; the obligation to respond by force to defend and protect the Sunnites in Syria.

Due to the effect and success of the Syrian based Jihadi groups, other jihadi groups as well as the main forums are adopting the twitter activism, advertising official forum accounts on the main pages with users within the forums using twitter hashtags (#) or references to twitter users (for example: @al_nukhba). A list of “The most important jihadi and support sites for jihad and the mujahideen on Twitter” was recently posted on the Shumukh al-Islam forum, allowing users to identify key accounts they might wish to follow.

Individual sympathizers and all those feeling inclined to contribute to the media jihad re-disseminate authoritative files of al-Qa’ida on twitter on a larger scale. Now all major jihadi media departments, part of militant networks, have their own channels on Twitter, linking to content from the jihadi forums and other social media platforms, primarily YouTube, Facebook, and pictures in general.

Twitter has turned into a primary hub for the distribution of jihadi agitprop files. These Jihadi information sharing networks using Twitter coexist, autonomously, with the classical forums. These networks carry, for example, samples of the wide range of jihadi propaganda files, in some cases placed first on Twitter, posted via mobile phones from the front lines. As a brief overview, a few samples consisting of:

 

  • martyrs in general and martyrdom operatives (istishhadiyyun) announced and identified by their hashtag and Twitter account;
  • calls for donations with phone numbers and social media contact information; taking care of the orphans of the martyrs among other civil elements;
  • general material of incitement, and the impact of online attained propaganda files used offline are popular and gain plenty of traction,

What are they sharing?

In addition to disseminating their own propaganda, jihadi media activists repurpose content from social movements and non-jihadi groups for their own purposes, framing the non-jihadi actions or demonstrations as part of the global militant struggle. This has created another ‘grey area’ where analysts have to carefully monitor and decipher such content. The forum administrators and media-activists also are starting to incorporate and misuse Twitter for their purposes, in coordinated attempts to virtually infiltrate legitimate social movements by using the same hash tags and a similar rhetoric to create ideological cohesion – and placing extremist views and files in that virtual sphere while claiming to fight on the ground for the sake of the people.

To analyze jihadi media networks, their sympathizers and followers we have used a combined approach focused on a unique interdisciplinary analysis of the data acquired by technical means and the subsequent and immediate analytical process of its content.

Using these methods we have asked a range of questions, how have jihadi propagandists been able to gain traction and a foothold online? How do they disseminate propaganda content to a global, multilingual audience and what resonates most with that audience? What are the networks through which their content flows and what are the different roles users play within these networks? Ultimately do the different jihadi twitter accounts reach a range of different communities, or is it a small densely interconnected echo chamber?

 

Fatwa calling for the death of the director, producer, and actors involved in making the film”Innocence of Muslims”

Posted September 18, 2012 by Nico Prucha
Categories: jihadica

With my dissertation coming to an end, I finally had some nerve and time to write a new posting at jihadica.com:

http://www.jihadica.com/fatwa-calling-for-the-death-of-the-director-producer-and-actors-involved-in-making-the-film-‘innocence-of-islam’/

Here is the full text, the embedded links in the text may not work as I am copying and pasting it from my jihadica posting:

Yesterday, Ahmad ‘Ashush published a fatwa on the jihadist forums where he “decrees and calls on all Muslim youth in America and in Europa to fulfill this inescapable obligation. Namely, to kill the director, producer and the actors and anyone who helped to promote this film.” The fatwa was published by the relatively new al-Bayan media group that has established itself in the jihadist forums since the turmoil in Egypt. The media group acts in parallel to the al-Faruq media battalion, which has in the meantime published several videos showing Egyptian cleric Ahmad ‘Ashush with other renowned jihadist scholars in Tahrir, such as Muhammad al-Zawahiri or Marjan Salim (videos here and here). Ahmad ‘Ashush first surfaced in the al-Shumukh forum a while ago with a lengthy interview talking about the Hizb al-Nur (here) and established himself as an Islamic authority clearly adhering to the “jihadist torrent” while his – as of now – few writings are online over at al-Maqdisi’s Minbar al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad website (here).

This fatwa, however, is not unique and certainly nothing new from ‘Ashush. In July, the German GIMF department (probably courtesy of Austrian-Egyptian leader Muhammad Mahmud, aka Abu Usamah al-Gharib) posted a German translations of ‘Ashush’s article “an outcry… Supporting our prophet” (German). This was a direct reaction by ‘Ashush to events in Germany demanding the death of those who insulted the prophet by showing the Danish Muhammad Cartoons, attacking both the German government as well as demanding the beheading of the defamers in Europe. A violent clash preceded ‘Ashush’s reaction when salafist-jihadists in Germany clashed with police in Bonn and Solingen in May this year. ‘Ashush wrote: “There are free youth among the Muslims, living in Europe, who became angry for the prophet. They went out to defend his honor. The Germans beat, humiliated and arrested them. So, where are you in support of them?”

The German-language propaganda departments had plenty of new materials and produced videos and published reaffirming translations justifying violence in support of the prophet. Again, GIMF published a German translation of al-Maqdisi’s writing “The Drawn Sword against those who Insult the Lord, the Religion or the Messenger of God” (Arabic and German). This is based on the historical writing of Ibn Taymiyya, available on al-Maqdisi’s site here.

The protests that turned violent were directed against a German ultra-rightwing minority party “PRO-NRW” who succeeded in instigating the German salafists by showing the Muhammad cartoons on billboards. With the police in the middle, the salafists counter-demonstration turned violent and led to many arrests. In a video entitled “In Reih und Glied standen sie für Rasulullah” (They stood in a single file for the messenger of God – here, note the Arabic opening nasheed) violence to defend the honor of the prophet is further justified and sanctioned, depicting the salafists as ‘true’ believers and real men. Shortly after, Abu Ibraheem (Yasin Chouka), one of the German propagandists of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan called for the “death of Pro-NRW”, re-affirming the obligation to “kill those, who insult the prophet, no matter if they are Muslims or disbelievers.” (here)

Two similar writings of Ahmad ‘Ashush – the ‘Muhammad-movie-fatwa’

In his self-entitled fatwa yesterday, ‘Ashush repeats basic sentiments he had addressed as a response to the insult of the prophet in Germany. In both legal decrees, ‘Ashush cites the Qur’an (al-Ahzab: 6):

“The Prophet has a greater claim on the faithful than they have on themselves, and his wives are (as) their mothers.” (trans. by Shakir)

‘Ashush seeks to act as a high-profile ideologue, citing in length the hadith and drawing on Ibn Taymiyya. “Killing them [the movie affiliates] is a duty for every capable Muslim. The killing of the aforementioned is prescribed by Islamic law (…).” Stating two examples, Ka’b ibn al-Ashraf, a Jew, that Ibn Taymiyya in detail analyzed and a woman who had insulted the prophet, ‘Ashush makes his case clear that “the prophet had commanded the killing of al-Ashraf” as well as the killing of a woman, as stated later. For ‘Ashush this serves as proof that anyone “offending the prophet, even Muslims, are sentenced to death for this.” Independent of Muslim or non-Muslim, man or woman, the blood of those insulting Muhammad must be shed. “For this is the ruling of the prophet”. ‘Ashush recounts the hadith of a female companion who on the account of a blind man insulted Muhammad and was subsequently put to death for her insults. The blind man had been her husband and he was the one who had killed her with his knife. He then stated to Muhammad the reason: “o messenger of God, I am her husband and she insulted you often (…) yesterday she insulted you and I took a knife and stabbed her in her stomach (…). The messenger replied: “so then witness her blood shed””.
This hadith, for ‘Ashush, provides enough argumentation to oblige Muslims to act accordingly, listing four key arguments:

As the man had been blind and a companion of the prophet most aware of the shari’a, the woman insulting the prophet had been killed. She had been his wife, killed by him.
Referring to the citation of the Qur’an, the prophet has a greater claim on the faithful than anyone else – even if this woman has children, or is the wife of a companion, she must be executed for her insult.
This accounts for no matter what standing of position her children have;
Or her position being a companion of the prophet, being in his service. “Killing her for insulting the prophet is pleasing for God, the Lord of the Worlds.”
Following a typical jihadist rhetoric, ‘Ashush repeats his statements of his writing in response to the insulting of the prophet in Germany, asking where the true scholars of Islam are, refuting the ‘state-owned’ ‘ulama’.

Jabha al-Nusra – a New Jihadi Group in Syria

Posted January 25, 2012 by Nico Prucha
Categories: Jihadist Ideology, online jihad, Syria

Announced a couple of days ago, as an important and urgent message without providing further information, users already ‘hoped’ a new jihadi group would be announced. Their hopes are being held up high, as of today Syria ‘officially’ has a jihadi group of its own, with, as it is en vogue for years and years to come, its own media outlet. The media outlet, al-Manarah al-Bayda, something like the white lighthouse, the beacon of light/hope in contrast to Hizbullah’s al-Manarah channel, perhaps, addresses the “people of Sham” for this is a “historic event”

We shall what the video reveals, so far the content provided shows the usual rhetoric and ideology that we know of. The focus on Sham (greater Syria) is not really new, but now, since the Arab Spring is increasingly being hijacked by Islamists and fighting ones in Libya and Syria, the jihadist media is daring enough to openly claim such language from inside.

AQIM issues statement kidnapping 5 EU citizens

Posted December 12, 2011 by Nico Prucha
Categories: AQIM (al-Qaeda in Africa, primarily Algeria, Mali and Mauretania), online jihad

In a statement just published on the usual jihadist online fora, AQIM via its al-Andalus media department claims the kidnapping of 5 Europeans and the displacement inside of Mali.
Interestingly, and most threatening for the hostages, is the claim that two Frenchmen among the kidnapped are “French spies”. The statement was published today, 12.12., but is dated to 7.12.
Two operations are claimed, first “in the east of Mali, the mujahideen were able to kidnap two men of the French intelligence”. The names, in Arabic transliteration, are provided with the claim of having conducted the kidnapping on November 24, 2011.
The second operation, on November 25, 2011, in Timbuktu led to the taking of the three other EU citizens whose nationalities are not disclosed in the statement.
In a third note, AQIM denies any attempt of kidnapping foreigners in Algeria at this time.

Why Mali?

While France is the most visible enemy and threat for AQIM, the address and the demands are directed to the governments of Mali and France. The alleged French spies are just another episode in the “continued hostilities” of the respective governments “against the Muslims in the Sahel”.
French and US efforts in combating al-Qa’ida are always perceived and reproduced by the jihadist propaganda as a combined threat and a dual manifestation of the enemy.
AQIM therefore kidnapped foreigners in Mali and keeps them there to exercise pressure on r government of Mali and to punish it at the same time. Concretely, not demands, but issues of grievance prior to the kidnappings are issued:
1. The case of Muhammad al-Amin who was extradited to Mauretania;
2. The case of Abu Sa’id al-Azwadi;
3. Abu Yunus al-Mali;
4. The Mali-Mauretanian joint military operation agains the mujahideen;
5. The rebuilding of an air base inside of Mali used by France to fight the mujahideen by aerial means and measurements.

The statement concludes by the expression of grief, French participation in Afghanistan, the appeasement by Mali to the west by imprisoning and killing Muslims. “if you want the soonest release of our hostages, and to protect their lives, you must answer the legitimate demands of the mujahideen” as is addressed in particular to the government of France.

Forthcoming Book: “New Approaches to the Analysis of Jihadism” (2011)

Posted April 13, 2011 by Nico Prucha
Categories: Blog-News, Blogroll, Jihadist Ideology

Rüdiger Lohlker (ed.), New Approaches to the Study of Jihadism, Göttingen: Vienna University Press 2011

featuring:

Introduction (Rüdiger Lohlker)

Virtual Jihad: A Real Danger (Philipp Holtmann)

Jihadist-Salafist Creed: Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi’s Imperatives of Faith (Orhan Elmaz)

From Kalashnikov to Keyboard: Pakistan’s Jihadiscapes and the Transformation of Lashkar-e Tayba (Thomas K. Gugler)

Virtual Leadership in the Jihadist Net: Rituals and Communicative Strategies to Guide Online Jihadists (Philipp Holtmann)

Navigating the Forgotten Swamp (Rüdiger Lohlker)

YouTube Jihad: A Rhetorical Analysis of an Islamist Propaganda Video (Bouchra Oualla)

Jihad via Bluetooth: al-Qa’ida’s Mobile Phone Campaign (Nico Prucha)

Worldwide Online Jihad versus the Gaming Industry Reloaded – Ventures of the Web (Nico Prucha)

For more information on the project “Jihadism Online” at the University of Vienna, please visit http://www.univie.ac.at/jihadism

10 methods to detect and foil the plots of spies – Abou Zakaria

Posted January 11, 2011 by Nico Prucha
Categories: counter-counter-terrorism, crazy english jihad forum

Published 30 December 2010, Abou Zakaria, who is tagged as a Administrator in the notorious Al Majahden English Network Forum, provides some counter-intel measurements to be taken seriously by every Mujahid and sympathizers. The English section was just established recently, what perhaps explains the date Abou Zakaria joined (24.12.2010). He nevertheless has written over 60 postings. His postings include reposting English material of Anwar al-Awlaqi, the Story of the Lives of Prophets, stories from the Caucasian jihadists and especially about Gaza (for example this story) or the English GIMF booklet by Abu Khabbab al-Misri, where he warns “Please use precautions when downloading by using appropriate anonymizing software.” In this contribution, the “10 methods to detect and foil the plots of spies”, he describes how spies are sought to operate and tries to decipher their ways of attempting to gain both trust and knowledge. Taken that this is taken from the English branch of the Al Majahden (al-Mujahideen) forum, Abou Zakaria is mostly concerned about potential attackers in the West whose cells may either be infiltrated or individuals who are led astray by intelligence agents and thus charged under terrorism laws. The latter happened to Mohamed Osman Mohamud, the attempted Oregon suspect of Somali origin who wanted to strike during Christmas time, hoping to detonate a car bomb. Zakaria particularly references Mohamud (see point eight) and cautions his brethren of spies while aiming to provide some potential to disrupt, identify and counter agitate endeavours of the intel agencies. “in light of recent events, most notably the arrest of our brother in Oregon (may Allah keep him steadfast and free him), I have decided to record and write down 10 methods which, through my own personal experiences, will shed light onto the tactics used by spies and/or informants to entrap and ultimately arrest Muslims, and the ways to defect and foil these plots.”

What you find here is a shortened and somewhat revised version of the original posting:

  1. A spy will always start with “grooming.” A process that takes several months and includes the individuals willingness to be active on the forums or attend mosques before trying to make any bonds. Once they make contact, the dialogue is typically small. Such topics as translations, finding nasheeds, looking for a husband/wife, or best places for halal food are discussed, simply because they are low key. These are used to gain trust and not seem blunt, because bluntness (i.e. talking about Jihad from day one) raises red flags. A spy may groom their target for months before mentioning Jihad, and even then, they will start out small, with such topics as “did you like the new video by As-Sahab” or “what is your favorite Jihadi nasheed.”

     

  2. You may notice red flags in the form of lies and inconsistencies. Such red flags can include changes in stories, which are typically elaborated upon once you make it known that you are aware in the changes in their stories. For example, a spy may mention he is a student in an American university. However, being smart, you notice he comes online or is at the mosque during what would be normally considered as school hours. When you say “I thought you were in school” they will quickly change their story to accommodate with a statement such as “I am taking online classes” or “I only go to night school.” Watch for small things which may seem insignificant, such as the mentions of family members, a job, or knowledge of a particular topic. If it is revealed that this person has told one lie, even if it involves something small, take precautions that everything may very well be a lie.

     

     

  3. Other red flags include major statements. These typically include claims to be a member of a Mujahideen organization, or to be in contact with Mujahideen or particular scholars, or to have known personally or met various leaders of the Mujahideen. This should be obvious. Anyone who makes these claims is either a liar, or if they are truthful, then they are extremely unknowing when it comes to security, both for themselves and for the Mujahideen whom they [ought to] represent. [But this is of course highly unlikely, as it would be contrary to portrayed behaviour codes of any Muj].

     

  4. A spy will typically claim to be busy, most likely with school studies. This person will frequently make apologies for not being around as a result of studying for midterms or doing homework. Spies use this ploy to make themselves seem normal, as if they have a life that can be related to. This does not mean that some of the Mujahideen are not students, because some in fact are. However, if one really seeks Jihad, and in particular Shahadah by means of an Istishhadi or Fidaye mission, it is unlikely their primary focus is schooling. They excuse of schooling is used most frequently, as opposed to health problems or a job, possibly because a target who is being groomed may feel that an unhealthy person is unfit for Jihad or a person who has a job and thus pays taxes is in some ways a collaborator. Regardless of the reasons, this excuse and constant apology for a late reply, even if it is sent a day or two after your message to them, is quite common.

     

     

  5. Spies will ask their targets to be “specific” and “clear.” For example, if you say you say you are interested in Jihad, they will ask if you mean physical Jihad. If you mention you have knowledge of firearms, they will ask what kind of firearms and what do you know. One must watch their words at all times, or better yet, say nothing. They reason spies ask their targets to be precise is not because they don’t understand you, but rather because if and when you are arrested, they want to make sure a jury will understand what you meant and thus convict you. If you are vague then there is a chance a jury will not convict. If you keep your mouth shut, then there is a chance you will not even be arrested. A spy may or may not make threats themselves, but will wait for you to do the talking. After all, it you they want, and no matter what threats a spy says, he cannot get into any trouble for making them. They want you to talk and be specific.

     

  6. In the process of grooming, a spy will always accept you. They will accept your manhaj and not debate it, even if they say it is different from their own. Typical behaviors such as smoking, listening to music, or hanging photos are never condemned by spies if the target says that they do this; spies may in fact claim to even do these things themselves. They will always answer personal questions and take no offense when you ask, because after all, they are lying. If you are a revert to Islam and make mention of sinful behaviors in your life prior to accepting Islam, a spy will not seem to care at all. Spies never appear to get mad at or disagree with their targets, except under one condition. This condition is if they target appears to break away from or become disenchanted with the idea of Jihad. Then they spy will badger their target, typically by bringing up their past words or using techniques to make them feel guilty. Only if the target seems to be against the Jihad which the spy is talking about – whether it is al-Qaeda or Jaish-e-Mohammad.

     

     

  7. Ask yourself, what does this person trust you? In a world where literally anyone can be a spy, why does this person trust you? Why are they claiming to be a Mujahid, and telling this to a person who they met over a computer or at the mosque? Why are they telling you they want to conduct Jihadist operations or make hijrah [the emigration to the battlefields of jihad in its jihadist definition]? You cannot know if anyone is sincere, and this is the sad reality. Think about why they would trust you of all people, and not someone else. The answer is because they are seeking to arrest you, and this is part of their grooming process. [So, the question is who can you trust these days while, what Abou Zakaria claims, the Islamic communities are 'flooded' with agent provocateurs and governmental run instigators?]

     

  8. Now ask yourself, if they already trust you, why do they need you? If they want you to make hijrah with them, ask yourself why they are not going alone or with someone else. If they need someone to carry out an operation on the home-front, as yourself, what do they pick you. If you look at the events of Oregon and learn from them, you will see that it was a group of “brothers” who in fact spies that recruited our noble brother, may Allah free him. One can now ask himself “if there was already a group of brother, amongst them a bomb maker, why did they need someone else to drive the car?” [Maybe because Mohamud wanted to become an istishhadi and by thus receive the attention by both the media and by AQ sympathizes on the forums??} If an individual already claims to know how to build a bomb, why would they ask you to plant it? [Well, it is reasonable as a bomb maker to make as many as possible before going down?] Is it because they are afraid to die? Is it because they want to make more bombs? Or, or than likely, is it because they want to entrap you? This is especially true in such scenarios that contain multiple spies. If there is already a group who is claiming to be Mujahideen and preparing an attack, what do they need from you? If they claim to be Fidayeen, why do they need one more? [Self-sacrificial operatives] Why not recruit ten more, why not use one less? Why do they ask you to help them train if they already claim to have knowledge of firearms and explosives? Why do they need a cameraman; cannot one of them film the training? Sometimes when an operation is to be carried out, if is you who is asked to plant the bomb. Ask yourself why do they want you to plant they bomb or become the Fidaye? And if they already have a plan, why do they trust you, a relative stranger, to help them? These questions must be asked. [The problem is rather the willingness to die in such an operation and having the potential to recruit expendable followers who seek 'martyrdom' anyway? Zakaria has some good points but he simply doesn't mention the effect the genre of jihad can have on individuals – for various reasons – such as Mohamud who sought to kill himself in a car bomb operation in Oregon. It may be true that a functioning cell has its operatives at hand but still can it be ruled out completely that recruits on the 'home front' are not entirely needed? The Oregon attempt and the FBI sting operation, however, have led to this dilemma for wanna-be jihadists and their hardcore siblings.]

     

  9. Spies will use excessive talk and training. Most operations, especially an istishhadi operation, does not need months upon months of training, but spies will make it appear as though it does. If they operation involves a bomb, there will be numerous dry runs or explosive demonstration. Why? For a shooting type Fidaye attack, spies will request months of training. Note also spies will more than likely ask to train on your property and to use your firearms if you have any. These types of operations do not need the types of planning spies often specify, and especially not the degree the specify. The first reason for this is to groom you and gain your trust. And the second reason is to ultimately delay the operation itself, which is, obviously a set up, after all. With regards to excessive talk, follow the aforementioned precautions of method five. Spies will want you to do all they talking. They will typically ask for your idea and your input and if you think anything can be changed or improved. They will ask you what you think would be a suitable target. They want for you to say that you desire to become an istishadi or that you seek to kill other people. Remember, silence is golden.

     

  10. Finally, if you suspect that you have fallen victim to entrapment of a spy, there are actions which should be taken. Obviously, you must cut all contact with the person you suspect of being a spy. However, beforehand it may be beneficial to tell them that you have in fact become disenchanted with Jihad. It may even be wise to claim that you have lost interest in Islam! Lie, lie, lie! Remember, this is a spy you are talking to. After which, it may be best to disappear. One need not give a reason, or they may use an excuse such as their wife is pregnant or they are moving away. It may be wise to change user names on forums or switch email accounts. Also important, if possible, do not let this individual know that you are aware that they are a spy. Otherwise, they may realize you are lying to them, and still continue to investigate you. And last but not least, warn anyone else who may have fallen victim to such entrapment, and reveal to them the aforementions methods used by spies.

     

“Fursan al-Shahada, part 8” highlights Nigeria and Central Africa

Posted November 19, 2010 by Nico Prucha
Categories: AQIM (al-Qaeda in Africa, primarily Algeria, Mali and Mauretania), Islamic State of Iraq (ISI)

Published some hours ago within the usual jihadist forums, the new ISI al-Furqan release does indeed focus on the conflict in Nigeria. But also the infamous minaret-ban in Switzerland is mentioned to portray how Islam and Muslims are being persecuted globally while being deliberately killed in certain zones of conflict (or in occupied territories such as Iraq and elsewhere where the Crusaders are active). Bosnia, Chechnya, Turkistan, the Philippines, Burma and Kashmir are also places where Muslims are under attack and mosques destroyed. With Nigeria being highlighted and introduced (basic geographical information, percentage of Muslims there, natural resources) a computer animated sequence introduces the video depicting a suicide-bomber driving a truck laden with explosives into a US-military base with a giant cross in the middle. Naturally, the cross is first knocked down by the truck before a gigantic animated explosion is set off showing then portrait pictures of the three self-inoculation operatives introduced in the video.

Attacks are being carried out in Iraq, the first attacker is from Saudi Arabia and his testimony “last words” are filmed with the operative behind the wheel of his bomb-rigged car. With the voice of Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi transitioning to Nigeria, once again showing the Aljazeera footage of the execution as well as a Christian preacher who lashes out against the Muslims (according to the Arabic translation). By all means Islam is under attack, the work of NGO’s are, of course, part of a greater plan to indoctrinate Muslim children and to further distort the true message of Islam.

Statements of the Mufti of Nigeria Ibrahim al-Husayni shown whereas the problem between Christians and Muslims are rather of tribal, economical and political nature. During his statement, which is also taken probably from Aljazeera, the video shows again and again the shooting sequences.

Scenes from AQIM’s video are introduced, showing the training of Mujahideen in some dessert while an AQIM member from Nigeria speaks out. The second self-inoculation operative in Iraq is then being portrayed, receiving his farewell hugs, working on IED’s and being accompanied by the voice of deceased AQI leader al-Muhajir and al-Baghdadi. His testimony was filmed in a living room like setting, striking out against the Christian-Crusaders, the Americans and the apostates. Children can be heard in the background. Followed by the testimony, the video shows Obama speaking at West Point and attacks the European Union, the partner of the US and the west as a whole with all its problems (economical (Lehmann Brothers), natural (BP Oil spill, Islands Vulcan)) and highlights Obama’s words who said that the US cannot deal with the problems by itself.

Subsequently the third operative is introduced (Saudi-Arabia) who seems to have himself blown up at a fortified road checkpoint.

The video ends with an address on how Muslims can help and what their obligations are.


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